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Abstract 
Risk assessment performs a critical decision support role in maintenance decision making. This is through 
assisting maintenance practitioners systematically identify, analyze, evaluate and mitigate equipment failures. 
Often, such failures are mitigated through formulating effective maintenance strategies. In asset maintenance, 
well-known risk assessment techniques include the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA), and Bayesian Networks (BN). In recent years, considerable research attention has been directed 
towards improving existing techniques, often at the expense of a structured framework for selecting suitable risk 
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assessment techniques.  Often, several criteria influence the selection process. Moreover, the criteria are closely 
linked to specific organizational competencies that vary from one firm to another. In this study, a selection 
methodology for risk assessment techniques in the maintenance decision making domain is proposed. In the 
methodology, generic selection criteria for the FMEA, FTA and BN are derived based on the risk assessment 
process outlined in the ISO 31000:2009 standard. The criteria are prioritized using the Analytic Network Process 
(ANP), taking into account the judgment and opinion of academic and industrial domain experts. The results 
illustrate the usefulness of the proposed methodology towards assisting maintenance practitioners discern 
important competencies relevant to the specific technique and as such select the technique best suited for the 
organization.  
Keywords: Asset maintenance, Risk assessment, Selection methodology, ANP 
1. Introduction 
The importance of asset management (AM) in the context of maintenance decision making 
is underscored in literature (Pintelon and Van Puyvelde, 2013). This is attributed to the fact 
that AM focuses on managing all phases of the asset’s lifecycle, right from inception to 
disposal. For operable assets, the operation and maintenance (O&M) phase is quite critical, 
often constituting as much as 70% of the asset’s total cost of ownership (Koronios et al., 
2007). As such, risk management forms an important aspect in AM.  This is highlighted 
through definitions of AM reported in literature.  For instance, the PAS-55 standard for asset 
management describes AM as “the systematic and coordinated practices through which 
organizations optimally and sustainably manage its assets, asset systems, their associated 
performance, risks and expenditures over the asset’s life-cycle for purposes of achieving the 
organization strategic plan.” Clearly, risk management is viewed as rather crucial with 
regards to mitigating equipment failures. For operable assets, this entails formulating effective 
maintenance strategies. 
The ISO 31000:2009 standard proposes a risk management framework that embeds 
policies, procedures and practices throughout the organization (International Electrotechnical 
Commision, 2009). The standard recognizes the strategic role of risk management with 
regards to recognizing and as such formulating risk mitigation strategies. Within the risk 
management process, risk assessment (RA) provides a crucial framework for systematically 
identifying, analyzing, evaluating and mitigating risks. To perform risk assessment, diverse 
techniques exist and are applied in diverse domains, e.g. project management, insurance, 
banking and the manufacturing industry (Berg, 2010). How these techniques are applied for 
risk assessment largely depends on the nature of perceived risks and as such, their use is not 
generalizable across domains (Berg, 2010). Thus, depending on the specific domain, risks 
may be perceived as operational, technological, safety, health or political.  
For the reasons mentioned above, assessing risks in one domain, e.g. in civil engineering 
projects differ considerably as compared to a different context, e.g. selecting appropriate 
maintenance strategies. Indeed, project management focuses on one-off activity and often, 
perceived risks may include selecting cost effective project, contractor selection, or managing 
project completion time (Dikmen et al., 2008). As such, techniques mentioned as deployed in 
project management include the Critical Path Method (CPM), Sensitivity Analysis (SA) or 
Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) (KarimiAzari et al., 2011). On the other hand, perceived risks 
in the maintenance decision making domain are largely technological given that maintenance 
decisions focus on the equipment’s operational phase (Pintelon and Van Puyvelde, 2013). 
Here, the emphasis is on equipment failure modes. In this context, commonly applied 
techniques include the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
and Bayesian Network (BN) (Khan and Haddara, 2003; Langseth and Portinale, 2007; 
Moubray, 1997).  
Apart from variation in terms of perceived risks, the criteria considered while selecting risk 
assessment techniques also differs. For instance, in project management, Lichtenstein (1996) 
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mentions several criteria that include the organizational structure, size and level of external 
party’s approval. In the maintenance decision making, important criteria mentioned include 
the need for multi-disciplinary teams, decision support tools, reliability data and supporting 
technologies (Barberá et al., 2012; Khan and Haddara, 2003; Moubray, 1997). In other 
articles, a more general criteria is mentioned, e.g. availability of resources, degree of 
uncertainty or complexity of the selected technique (International Electrotechnical 
Commision, 2009).  
From the above discussion, it is apparent that selecting suitable risk assessment techniques 
varies depending on among other factors, the type of technique, the application domain and 
nature of perceived risks. Owing to the aforementioned factors, the techniques are seldom 
generalizable across domains and as such, the selection process varies widely with the 
application context. This applies to selecting techniques in the asset maintenance domain.  
The importance of selecting appropriate techniques in maintenance decision making is 
underscored in several studies. Braaksma et al. (2013) presents empirical evidence showing 
that application of the FMEA in practice does not support common postulates described in 
literature. One important postulate relates to the use of FMEA as a basis for formulating 
maintenance strategies. In this regard, the authors mention that the FMEA process is often a 
one-off exercise. As such, formulated strategies are seldom updated with emergence of new 
sources of risks. Part of the reasons mentioned for non-repetitive FMEA is the need for tacit 
knowledge with regards to the risk assessment process. Moreover, unavailability of 
documentation that aids in the process is cited as an important problem.  
Bloom (2005) points out rather grimly that the success rate of implementing the Reliability 
Centered Maintenance (RCM) program is often low – in the range of 5-10%. It should be 
mentioned that the FMEA constitute core phases in the RCM program (Moubray, 1997).  The 
authors mention several reasons for the low success rate. These include the general lack of 
user know-how and the need for plant schematics. Cheng et al. (2008) also highlight the link 
between requisite competencies and application of the FMEA in risk analysis. Examples 
mentioned by the authors include the need for personnel training and technological support. It 
is intuitive that these requisite competencies also apply to other techniques, e.g. the FTA and 
BN. Moreover, this highlights the need for a methodological approach for selecting 
appropriate techniques while at the same time, taking into account requisite competencies.  
In literature, insufficient attention has been paid to formulation of a methodological 
framework for selecting suitable techniques. Ideally, the framework takes into account the 
organizational competencies with respect to applying the specific risk assessment technique. 
This in turn increases the chances of success when such techniques are applied for risk 
assessment and formulating maintenance strategies. On the other hand, the absence of such a 
framework could negatively influence the results of the derived maintenance strategies. This 
is especially the case where techniques are selected ad-hoc or based on perceived popularity, 
e.g. FMEA (Braaksma et al., 2013). Moreover, deriving maintenance strategies based 
primarily on user experience may yield inappropriate maintenance decisions. Given the 
strategic importance of maintenance programs towards sustaining the organizational 
competitiveness, the role of risk assessment cannot be ignored (Pintelon and Van Puyvelde, 
2013). For this reason, a structured methodology for selecting appropriate risk assessment 
techniques is proposed. The methodology takes into account the organizational competencies. 
Moreover, the competencies are prioritized using the Analytic Network Process (ANP) 
methodology. The derived competencies are generic and as such applicable across different 
techniques.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the implicit link between risk 
assessment and asset maintenance. This is followed by a brief review of classification 
schemes for risk assessment techniques and existing selection frameworks applied in different 
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domains. Section 3 outlines the methodological steps adopted in this article, starting with 
deriving the generic selection criteria and followed by prioritizing the competencies using the 
ANP methodology. Section 4 describes the approach applied for deriving the generic 
competencies. Section 5 discusses the ANP methodology as applied for prioritizing 
competencies for the FMEA, FTA and BN. Section 6 illustrates industrial application and 
recommended use for the selection framework. Section 7 presents general guidelines for use, 
while Section 8 presents discussion and managerial implications of the proposed 
methodology. Section 9 draws important conclusions and directions for future work.   
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1 Situating risk assessment in maintenance decision making 
In operable assets, equipment failure is regarded as an important risk aspect. This is due to 
the fact that asset failure is often associated with consequences that may be economic, 
environment and/or safety in nature (Khan and Haddara, 2003). For instance, a sheared 
component may injure the operator, cause spillage and moreover, lead to high repair costs. 
For this reason, formulating mitigation strategies through asset maintenance programs is 
rather important (Pintelon and Van Puyvelde, 2013).  Often, such programs ideally encompass 
two core aspects; maintenance policy selection, and determining appropriate maintenance 
actions. Maintenance actions imply the elementary interventions performed by the technician 
in response to the equipment state or condition and may include preventive or restorative 
actions. Maintenance actions are largely linked to the type of maintenance policy. For 
instance, corrective maintenance actions are often undertaken in the Failure Based 
Maintenance (FBM) policy. On the other hand, preventive repair actions are carried out in the 
Time/Use Based Maintenance (TBM/UBM) policy (Pintelon and Van Puyvelde, 2013). Other 
well-known maintenance policies include the Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) and 
Opportunity Based Maintenance (OBM).  
 When selecting the right maintenance strategy, risk assessment performs a crucial role. 
Here, the risk assessment provides an important decision support structure that aids the 
selection process. Decision support frameworks mentioned in literature where risk assessment 
is embedded include the Reliability Centered Maintenance (Moubray, 1997) and Risk Based 
Inspection and Maintenance (RBIM) (Khan and Haddara, 2003). Notably, the FMEA is an 
essential technique in the RCM methodology. On the other hand, the FTA is embedded in 
RBIM. These techniques aid in criticality assessment where maintenance strategies are 
assigned on the basis of the criticality of the equipment failure mode. Though viewed as a 
stand-alone technique, the Bayesian Network is an important technique in the sense that it 
attempts to replicate the FTA’s formalism, more so, with respect modelling system 
dependencies. The dependencies may be technical (i.e. inter-linkage between components), 
functional or logical (e.g. failure sequence) (Van Horenbeek et al., 2010).  
In their initial form, the FMEA, FTA and BN are somewhat classical and standard risk 
assessment techniques. For instance, the FMEA defines the Risk Priority Number (RPN) as a 
measure of failure mode criticality. On the other hand, the FTA defines a formal hierarchical 
structure based on binary gates. The BN incorporates conditional probabilities as a measure of 
combinatorial dependencies between failure events. Nonetheless, recent years has seen a 
proliferation of alternative techniques for the FMEA, FTA and BN. These techniques aim at 
improving well-known deficiencies associated with the classical approaches, e.g. the RPN 
form or non-inclusion of temporal aspects associated with operable assets (epin and Mavko, 
2002; Liu et al., 2013; Weber et al., 2012).  For FMEA, Liu et al. (2013) notes the availability 
of numerous alternative techniques. For FTA, Chiacchio et al. (2011) distinguishes between 
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static and dynamic techniques depending on how temporal aspects are taken into account. For 
the BN, Weber et al. (2012) also distinguished between static and dynamic techniques.  
Moreover, the alternative techniques for FMEA, FTA and BN range from fairly simple to 
rather complex approaches. For instance, several techniques incorporate solution algorithms 
based on, e.g. fuzzy logic or linear programming, further increasing the computational 
complexities. As such, applying the improved techniques is not straightforward. For instance 
here, user know-how becomes quite important, further complicating the selection process for 
the appropriate technique. This leads to important questions regarding the selection problem: 
(i) Which techniques are best suited for the organization taking into account the 
organizational competencies? 
(ii) Which competencies should the organization focus on prior to applying the selected 
risk assessment technique? 
A framework addressing these questions is seldom discussed in literature. This research 
study addresses this gap by proposing a conceptual methodology for selecting suitable risk 
assessment techniques. The main motivation of the research is to provide practitioners with a 
structured approach for selecting appropriate techniques while taking into account the 
requisite organizational competencies. Invariably, this enhances the maintenance decision 
support with regards to selecting appropriate maintenance strategies.  
2.2 Risk assessment classification and selection schemes 
Despite the important role risk assessment techniques perform in maintenance decision 
making, methodological approaches that assist practitioners select suitable techniques is 
missing in literature. Instead, existing work largely focus on reviewing existing techniques 
and on the basis of the review, propose classification schemes, e.g. see (Arunraj and Maiti, 
2010; Faber and Stewart, 2003; Marhavilas et al., 2011; Tixier et al., 2002). The schemes 
often vary according to the specific author and may take into account aspects such as the type 
of input data, type of technique, or output data generated from the specific technique. 
However, these schemes often lack a formal structure that could aid practitioners select a 
suitable technique. Moreover, the techniques mentioned in these schemes are seldom linked to 
specific competencies necessary for performing risk assessment.   
The ISO/IEC 31010 standard for risk assessment techniques propose several attributes 
necessary for applying generic risk assessment techniques (International Electrotechnical 
Commision, 2009). However, the proposed attributes are rather general and seldom linked to 
specific competencies. For instance, the standard mentions attributes, e.g. resource capacity or 
complexity of the specific technique. It should be mentioned that such attributes are vague 
and not linked to specific competencies, e.g. personnel skills or documentation.  Moreover, 
the standard applies a qualitative ranking (i.e. low, medium and high) for evaluating the 
suitability of the specific technique. However, such ranking can be quite restrictive and 
moreover lacks the comprehensiveness required for selecting techniques in the real world 
setting.  
Dey and Ogunlana (2004) propose a model for selecting techniques applicable in build-
operate-transfer projects. The model is based on logical decision trees with the selected 
technique derived through a binary query process. However, the techniques evaluated in the 
study apply to the project management domain, thus not generalizable to maintenance 
decision making. Moreover, no reference is made to appropriate competencies necessary for 
applying the mentioned techniques in risk assessment. Moreover, the logical decision making 
approach proposed in the article exposes the selection exercise to considerable bias especially 
where several decision makers are involved.  
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Recently, KarimiAzari et al. (2011) propose a model for selecting techniques applicable in 
the construction industry.  The model formulates the selection problem as Multi Criteria 
Decision Making (MCDM) problem and based on the Fuzzy Technique for Order Preference 
by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) methodology (Tzeng and Huang, 2011). Similar to 
the aforementioned article, the techniques evaluated in the selection model apply to the 
project management domain, thus not generalizable to maintenance decision making. 
Moreover, the authors fail to link the mentioned techniques to the competencies necessary for 
application in risk assessment.  
The deficiencies discussed in the previous paragraphs are addressed by the selection 
methodology proposed in this article. Firstly, requisite competencies necessary for applying 
specific techniques are derived from literature. Moreover, the derived competencies are 
generic and as such, applicable to the FMEA, FTA and BN techniques.  The competencies are 
also linked to the risk assessment steps outlined in the ISO 31000:2009 standard. The 
competencies are prioritized using the ANP methodology. This way, decision makers are able 
to select techniques best suited for the organization, given the often varying organizational 
competencies. Moreover, the selection methodology avoids the need for selecting techniques 
in an ad-hoc manner, which as earlier mentioned may yield inappropriate maintenance 
decisions.  
3. Risk assessment selection methodology 
The selection methodology discussed in this article consists of four main phases depicted 
in Figure 1. The steps are as follows: 

Figure 1: Methodological steps 
Step 1. Deriving the generic selection criteria: In this step, the selection criteria are derived, 
first by linking different competencies to the specific techniques and secondly, linking the 
competencies to the ISO 31000:2009 risk assessment steps. The techniques considered in the 
derivation process are the FMEA, FTA and BN. For FMEA, both the classical and 
quantitative techniques are considered. For the FTA and BN, the static and dynamic 
techniques are included. 
Step 2. Establishment of the team of experts: The experts participating in the group 
decision process are selected by virtue of their knowledge with respect to applying specific 
risk assessment techniques in asset maintenance.   
Step 3. Formulating the decision problem and constructing the ANP network structure: In 
this step, a careful formulation of the decision problem is undertaken. Here, the decision 
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making process is adapted whereby group decisions are reached through a consensus vote. On 
the basis of the decision problem, the ANP network structure is formulated.  
Step 4. Derive the global priorities: In this step, the selection criteria are prioritized with 
respect to the specific techniques. Here, the ANP methodology is adopted. Prioritizing the 
competencies assists decision makers select the suitable technique while taking into account 
the intrinsic organizational competencies.  
4. Deriving the generic selection criteria 
Deriving the selection criteria takes into account the practicality and exhaustiveness 
necessary for applying the techniques in risk assessment. The criteria are derived through a 
systematic literature search where specific competencies necessary for applying the different 
techniques are discussed. An overview of the derived criteria and citations are presented in 
Table 1.    
In the derivation process, the risk assessment process described in the ISO 31000:2009 is 
adapted (see Figure 2). Three important steps are mentioned in the standard, namely: (1) risk 
identification; (2) risk analysis; and (3) risk evaluation. The forth step, i.e. risk mitigation, 
entails implementing effective maintenance strategies, achieved through selecting appropriate 
maintenance policy. The forth step is beyond the scope of this article, thus not discussed.  
Ideally, each risk assessment technique follows the steps depicted in Figure 2. Closely 
linked to these steps are several requisite competencies that influence how each technique is 
applied for assessing risks in operable assets. As mentioned earlier, the selection criteria is 
rather important given that a firm lacking certain competencies, e.g. personnel expertise or 
reliability database may be disadvantaged with regards to applying a specific technique.  
As an illustration, consider the case where the FMEA technique is used. At the risk 
identification step, failure modes are identified. To aid in the identification process, ‘decision 
support tools’ e.g. Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&ID) and ‘maintenance records’ 
may prove useful. The support tools facilitate ‘functional analysis’ by identifying functional 
failures (MIL-STD-1629A, 1980; Moubray, 1997). Moreover, defining such failures requires 
an understanding of the equipment performance. As such, ‘performance assessment’ becomes 
necessary where ‘system loss indicators’ are defined and catalogued. In addition, the 
maintenance staff should possess skills necessary to interpret the ‘process description 
diagrams’ (e.g. the P&ID) and also perform the functional analysis. Thus, important decision 
criteria for the FMEA at the risk identification step include decision support tools, 
performance assessment, in-depth understanding of the RCM methodology and personnel 
skills.  
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Figure 2: A summary of linkage between the selection criteria and risk assessment 
At the risk analysis step, possible causes and potential consequences for functional failures 
are analyzed. Here, several decision elements are required.  For instance, ‘operation and 
maintenance records’ may catalogue potential causes identified during the equipment repair 
process. On the other hand, records on spare parts requisition, manpower hours, spare part 
order lead time and production loss may assist in computing potential consequences, in this 
case, cost of failure. Of course, supporting technologies e.g. ‘computerized maintenance 
management system’ with extended software modules, e.g. ‘maintenance budget control’ may 
provide decision support (Barberá et al., 2012; Echeverry and Leverette, 2004).  Moreover, 
‘reliability databases’ may be linked to ‘customized FMEA software’ where reliability 
analysis is derived using appropriate ‘statistical models’ (Barberá et al., 2012; Relex, 2010). 
As such, important risk metrics such as probability of failure may be computed from ‘failure 
functions’, e.g. Weibull or logistic distribution functions (Braaksma et al., 2012). Of course, 
using the FMEA software requires appropriate ‘personnel skills’. It should be mentioned that 
competencies such as reliability databases, software tools and personnel competencies also 
apply to alternative FMEA techniques, e.g. quantitative FMEA (Braaksma et al., 2013). The 
risk evaluation step establishes the acceptable risk threshold for asset failures. As such, 
competencies such as ‘maintenance cost records’, or ‘maintenance cost database’ are quite 
important (Echeverry and Leverette, 2004).  
The deductive reasoning approach discussed in the previous paragraphs is likewise adopted 
for the FTA and BN. It is important to mention that the criteria deduced for the FMEA 
likewise applies to the FTA and BN. This is due to the fact that FMEA, FTA and BN 
techniques follow the risk assessment process depicted in Figure 2. However, the criteria may 
vary in importance depending on the specific technique. For instance, the reliability database 
may be perceived as more important with regard to the FTA as compared to the classical 
FMEA approach. For the BN, availability of software tools and personnel expertise on 
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statistical theory may be perceived as overriding competencies. As such, the derived criteria 
depicted in Table 1 may be seen as generic, thus applying across the techniques. The variation 
in importance is seen as important motivation for formulating the selection process as a 
MCDM problem.  
In total, 30 selection criteria are identified and grouped into 8 decision clusters as depicted 
in Table 1. Formulating the selection problem and applying the ANP methodology is 
discussed next in Section 5.  
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5. Analytic network process (ANP) methodology 
In this section, the remaining 3 steps of the methodology are discussed. These include 
establishing the team of experts, formulating the selection problem, structuring the ANP 
network and deriving the priority weights.  
The ANP is a generalization of the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) and considered an 
ideal tool for resolving complex decision making problems (Saaty, 2004). Unlike the AHP 
where the decision problem is structured in a hierarchical form, in ANP, the decision problem 
is structured in a network form. Here, the decision clusters and elements are connected 
through network links. The links express the dependencies amongst the clusters and elements. 
Dependencies between elements in the same decision cluster are represented through inner 
dependencies while dependencies between elements in one cluster and those in a different 
cluster are represented through outer dependencies (Saaty, 2004).  
The ANP methodology is considered an ideal choice for formulating the selection 
problem for several reasons. Firstly, the ANP is suitable for solving complex decision 
problems that are multi-criteria in nature. Often, real-life decision problems are rather 
complex and as such there is the need to take into account trade-offs between both tangible 
and intangible decision criteria (Saaty, 2004). To account for these trade-offs, the ANP 
methodology allows decision makers to express their preference between decision elements 
through the reciprocal pairwise comparison process. This comparison is based on the Saaty’s 
fundamental scale (Saaty, 1990). Moreover, consistency in the decision making process is 
evaluated through computing the Consistency Ratio (CR).  
Moreover, the ANP methodology takes into account interdependencies between clusters 
and decision elements in the ANP network structure. For instance, the criterion ‘software 
tools’ is dependent on ‘personnel skills’. Taking into account these dependencies is important 
with regards to deriving the overall priorities. Indeed, aspects ranked as less important using 
hierarchical MCDM approaches, e.g. AHP may in fact rank as more important when network 
dependencies are taken into account (Saaty, 2004).   
The ANP methodology applies the eigenvalue method as the primary technique for 
deriving overall priorities. However, there is considerable criticism regarding the eigenvalue 
approach, e.g. see Bana e Costa and Vansnick (2008). Much of the criticism relates to the 
rank reversal phenomena often attributed to the eigenvalue method. Nonetheless, such 
criticisms are countered by several authors, e.g. Wang et al. (2009) where the robustness of 
the eigenvalue method with respect to preserving priority ranking is validated through 
numerical illustrations. Moreover, Ishizaka and Labib (2011) assert that the link between the 
eigenvalue method and the rank reversal phenomena remains largely unresolved. For this 
reason, the robustness of the eigenvalue approach as applied in the ANP methodology is not 
negated. Indeed, applicability of the eigenvalue methodology in ANP is demonstrated in 
several studies, e.g. maintenance performance measurement (Van Horenbeek and Pintelon, 
2014), maintenance strategy evaluation (Jajimoggala et al., 2011), and outsourcing decision 
making (Tjader et al., 2014).  
5.1 Application of ANP methodology for the selection problem 
5.1.1 Establish the team of experts 
Given that decisions in the pairwise comparison process involve several persons, group 
decision making is often suggested. This way, bias associated with judgment expressed by a 
single expert is avoided (Ishizaka and Labib, 2011). When formulating group decisions, the 
role of a synergistic team of experts is underscored. Here, the synergistic team differs from a 
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collection of individuals, but rather implies a team that is knowledgeable with the decision 
problem at hand (Ishizaka and Labib, 2011).  
Moreover, formulating representative group decisions is viewed as an important challenge 
with respect to multiple decision makers. For this reason, several authors, e.g. Dyer and 
Forman (1992) propose several approaches that include the consensus vote method and 
aggregation (e.g. the geometric mean). While Aczél and Saaty (1983) mention the geometric 
mean as the correct approach for synthesizing group decisions, other authors, e.g. Van 
Horenbeek and Pintelon (2014) caution that aggregating group decisions prior to 
understanding the decision problem (i.e. discussed in a group session) only yields averaged 
individual decisions that are not necessarily representative. Moreover, the consensus vote is 
mentioned as an important cognitive decision making approach where the synergistic team is 
involved (Janis, 1989). For this reason, the consensus vote is adapted in this study. In 
consensus voting, the team of experts deliberate and reach an agreement on the pairwise 
comparison value that is afterwards entered in the ANP matrix.  
However, several authors criticize the aspect of assigning crisp pairwise comparison 
values, e.g. see (Büyüközkan et al., 2011; Chamodrakas et al., 2010; Lupo, 2013). Instead, the 
authors suggest a fuzzy scale that takes into account the uncertainty and imprecise nature of  
the elicited crisp values. While it is argued that the fuzzy methodology improves the pairwise 
comparison process, the premise/validity of the crisp scale is not negated. Indeed, authors, e.g. 
Saaty (2004), argues that the imprecision of the crisp values is satisfactorily addressed by the 
eigenvalue method. Moreover, Wang et al. (2009) shows using numerical illustrations that the 
consistency ratio (CR) is a rather good measure of the impreciseness of elicited decisions. For 
these reasons, the eigenvalue approach is considered robust enough.  
Nonetheless, a careful selection of decision makers is performed and takes into account 
aspects such as the experts understanding of the specific risk assessment techniques. The 
experts are drawn from academia and industry and knowledgeable on two techniques, i.e. the 
FMEA and FTA. The BN on the other hand is found to be scarcely applied in industry thus 
not evaluated by the industrial experts. Nonetheless, the BN is discussed here for illustrative 
purposes where the pairwise comparison process is based on the authors’ experience. The 
objective of including the BN in the comparison process is to illustrate the versatility of the 
derived generic criteria as the basis for comparing multiple risk assessment techniques.   
The team of industrial experts evaluating the FMEA and FTA combine experience gained 
while working for a well-known European automobile manufacturer. The academicians’ core 
area of interest is asset maintenance. Following the approach proposed in Van Horenbeek and 
Pintelon (2014), a generic ANP network structure depicted in Figure 3 is formulated to aid in 
the decision making process.  
5.1.2 Model development and problem formulation 
Figure 3 depicts the ANP network structure consisting of 30 decision elements grouped 
into 8 decision clusters depicted in Table 1. The decision clusters are represented by nodes, 
while the dependencies amongst the clusters are represented by arcs. Depending on the nature 
of the dependencies, the arcs are of two types; two-way arrows and looped arc. The two-way 
arrow depicts outer dependence, e.g. between the clusters ‘software tools’ and ‘personnel 
skills’.  On the other hand, the looped arc depict inner dependence amongst elements in a 
decision cluster, e.g. between elements in the cluster ‘decision support tools’.  
The outer and inner dependencies are defined with respect to a control criterion, in this 
case, selecting the specific risk assessment technique, e.g. FMEA. For this reason, the ANP 
network varies depending on the specific technique.  Moreover, the network depicted in 
Figure 3 may be considered generic, thus applying to the FMEA, FTA and BN. Here, 
depending on the type of technique, the network may be customized by adding or omitting 
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decision cluster/elements or modifying the network links. For instance, the cluster “data 
collection schemes” may be omitted when evaluating the classical FMEA selection problem. 
This is intuitive considering the classical FMEA largely relies on estimates derived from 
multi-disciplinary teams instead of historical data.  
 


Figure 3: The conceptual ANP model 
5.1.3 Pairwise comparison and consistency check 
In the reciprocal pairwise comparison process, the relative importance of the 
clusters/elements is established based on the Saaty’s scale. For detailed information on the 
pairwise comparison process, the interested reader is referred to the work of Saaty (Saaty, 
2004). Table 2 depicts the pairwise comparison for the decision cluster ‘software tools’ with 
respect to the selecting the FMEA technique. Table 3 on the other hand depicts the pairwise 
comparison matrix for the decision clusters. Table 2 and Table 3 represent the inner and outer 
dependencies respectively with respect to selecting the FMEA technique.  
To facilitate the pairwise comparison process, the expert opinion are elicited based on the 
following questions (Saaty, 1996): 
1. With respect to selecting a specific risk assessment technique, which of two 
criterions is dominant? 
2.  Which of the two criterions influences a third element and how strongly with 
respect to selecting the risk assessment technique? 

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The elicited responses are afterwards translated into numerical scores. It should be 
mentioned that the FTA and BN are evaluated as a family of techniques rather than their 
respective alternatives, e.g. dynamic FTA/BN.  However, these alternatives may be included 
in the analysis in a rather straightforward way. This is through customizing the ANP network 
with respect to the specific technique, i.e. by omitting/including decision elements and/or 
clusters as earlier mentioned. Moreover, the ANP network links may also be modified to 
represent the perceived dependencies with respect to the alternative technique, thus the ANP 
network structure may also be seen as generic.  
For brevity, the following paragraphs illustrate the case of prioritizing criteria with respect 
to selecting the FMEA technique. First, the ANP network depicted in Figure 3 is customized 
by omitting the decision cluster ‘methodology’ and the decision elements ‘configuration 
management’, ‘report generation module’, ‘analytic logic techniques’, ‘conditional probability 
table’, ‘deterioration models’ and ‘maintainability models’. The cluster ‘methodology’ is 
omitted owing to the fact that the FMEA technique is linked to the RCM methodology. The 
decision elements are omitted due to their perceived limited influence with respect to applying 
the FMEA technique. For instance, the ‘analytic logic techniques’ and ‘conditional probability 
tables’ are linked to the FTA and BN techniques respectively, thus not essential with respect 
to the FMEA. However, it is worth noting that the element ‘reliability database’ is retained. 
This is attributed to its importance with respect to the quantitative FMEA technique where the 
risk metric, probability of failure, is derived from reliability analysis. As such, historical 
failure database is important.  
For the FMEA selection problem, pairwise comparison matrices were derived from the 
customized ANP network. For each matrix, the priority vectors are derived through 
computing the principal eigenvector which upon normalization transforms to local priority 
values (Saaty, 2004). The same approach is adapted for the FTA and BN. 
Table 2: Pairwise comparison for elements in the decision support tools cluster 
Pairwise comparison of decision elements within the software tools cluster with respect to FMEA  
FMEA CMMS EAM FMEA software 
Computerized maintenance management system (CMMS) 1 1 1/4 
Enterprise asset management (EAM) 1 1 1/4 
Customised FMEA software 4 4 1 
Local priorities 0.167 0.167 0.667 
Consistency Ratio (CR)                                0         
 
As depicted on Table 2 and Table 3, the most important decision element on the basis of 
local priorities is the ‘FMEA software’. On the other hand, the CMMS and EAM are 
perceived to be of equal importance. From Table 3, the most important decision clusters 
include ‘personnel skills’ followed by ‘decision support tools’. The derived local priority 
values form the basis of forming the ANP supermatrices, further discussed in Section 5.1.4. 
For each matrix, a consistency check is performed to evaluate consistency in the decision 
making process. A consistency ratio (CR) of 0.1 or less is indicative of consistency. Thus, the 
pairwise comparison values for Tables 2 and 3 fulfil the consistency requirements.  
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Table 3: Pairwise comparison for the decision clusters with respect to FMEA 
Pairwise comparison of the decision clusters with respect to selecting the FMEA 
FMEA SC 1 SC 2 SC 3 SC 4 SC 5 SC 6 SC 8 
Software tools 1 3 1/4 3 3 1/4 1/5 
Software modules 1/3 1 1/5 1/4 1/4 1/3 1/6 
Analysis/decision support tools 4 5 1 4 3 2 1/5 
Data collection schemes 1/3 4 1/4 1 1 1/3 1/5 
Statistical models 1/3 4 1/3 1 1 1/4 1/5 
Performance measurement 4 3 1/2 3 4 1 1/5 
Personnel skills 5 6 5 5 5 5 1 
Local priorities 0.1003 0.0352 0.1974 0.0750 0.0745 0.1495 0.3681 
Consistency ratio (CR) 0.096 
 
5.1.4 Supermatrix formation and deriving global priority weights 
The unweighted supermatrix is constructed using the local priority values derived from the 
pairwise comparison matrices. The unweighted supermatrix is normalized by making the sum 
of each column equal to one, thus transforming to the weighted supermatrix. Next, the 
weighted supermatrix is raised to arbitrary large numbers, i.e. the power 12 +k  up until 
convergence is reached. At convergence, further raising the supermatrix to powers does not 
significantly change the matrix values (Saaty, 2004). The convergence supermatrix (i.e. limit 
supermatrix) for the FMEA selection problem is depicted in Table 4 and represents the global 
priority vectors for the FMEA selection problem. Although evaluated using the 
aforementioned approach, the limit supermatrix for the FTA and BN are not depicted for the 
purpose of brevity. 
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5.2 Analysis of illustrative case results: prioritized selection decision elements 
Figure 4 illustrates the limit priority vectors for selecting the FMEA, FTA and BN. The 
FMEA and FTA are based on the pairwise comparison process undertaken by the team of 
experts. On the other hand, the BN are included for illustrative purposes to emphasize 
versatility of the selection methodology. The priority vectors are derived from the limit 
supermatrices depicted, e.g. Table 4.   
 
Figure 4. Comparison of the limit priorities for the FMEA, FTA and BN 
From the results, the following conclusions can be drawn. For the FMEA technique, the 
decision element ‘reliability database’, with a weight of 0.091, is perceived as the important 
requirement. While this may seem strange given the subjectivity of the classic FMEA, recent 
research suggests a shift towards use of quantitative FMEA techniques. In fact, the classic 
FMEA is perceived as cumbersome given time and manpower resource requirements. These 
concerns are partly addressed by quantitative FMEA approaches where the risk metrics, e.g. 
probability of failure are derived from equipment reliability data. Moreover, the failure 
consequences, i.e. in terms of cost, may also be derived from repair cost information, e.g. 
spare part usage. This negates the need for subjective estimates.  
Further, to aid in decision support, the decision element ‘process description diagrams’ is 
viewed as an important selection criterion for FMEA. The diagrams assist decision makers’ 
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map out critical assets and often an important first step in the risk assessment process. 
Moreover, ‘personnel skills’ and ‘personnel skills matrix’ are perceived as important which is 
intuitive given the necessary expertise needed for applying FMEA. On the other hand, several 
elements relevant to the classic FMEA are assigned low priorities. For instance, the decision 
elements, ‘multi-disciplinary teams’, ‘facilitators’ and ‘expert elicitation techniques’ are 
ranked lowly. This may be attributed to the perception that diverting manpower resources for 
performing the classic FMEA approach is disruptive to work activities and consumes time. 
This agrees with several authors, e.g. Braaksma et al. (2013) where the classic FMEA is cited 
as one-off exercise and rarely repetitive. As a result, maintenance decisions are seldom linked 
to output of the FMEA process. 
For the FTA technique, the selection criterion ‘computerized maintenance management 
system’ is perceived as the most important. This is attributed to the fact that FTA is largely a 
statistical approach, thus relies on reliability data. The CMMS performs an important role in 
deriving such data, mainly through generating maintenance work orders. Such orders specify 
the type of failure, spare part usage and associated downtime. Moreover, the CMMS provides 
a platform for storing data in ‘reliability databases’. To facilitate reliability analysis, ‘failure 
functions’, ‘personnel skills’ and ‘knowledge/skills matrix’ are perceived as important 
selection criterion. The importance of PDD for mapping system dependability is underscored 
in FTA. Here, the PDD provides a crucial decision support tool for mapping hierarchical 
system failure dependencies, often, technical or logical. The dependencies here differ from the 
ANP methodology in that, the FTA models system dependability in hierarchical form; the top 
representing the system failure event and at the bottom, component failure events.   
To illustrate the practical application and recommendation for use of the proposed 
selection framework, two industrial cases are selected for discussion.  
 
6 Illustrative industrial application of the selection framework 
 
6.1 Application in the process industry  
 
The first illustrative case draws from the authors’ knowledge of the European process 
industries and complemented by multiple empirical studies (Braaksma et al., 2013; Muchiri et 
al., 2010; Pinjala et al., 2006; Veldman et al., 2011). The studies investigate common 
postulates related to equipment maintenance in the process industries. The studies evaluates 
postulates postulates regarding the practical use of the FMEA, maintenance performance 
measurement, relationship between business and maintenance strategy, and condition based 
maintenance. Although the postulates differ, the empirical studies yield intereresting insights 
on competencies embedded in the process industries and linked to the selection framework 
discussed in this article. Table 5 summarises the cited competencies and embeddedness based 
on the level of support for the particular postulate.   
From the summary, several postulates of interest to the selection framework are mentioned 
as supported and thus embedded in the process industries. These include the availability of 
plant registers, failure mode identification registers, custom spreadsheets, maintenance 
management systems, failure databases, highly skilled workforce, and use of quantitative 
performance  measures. The latter, i.e. quantitative performance measures, e.g. time to failure 
(TTF) forms the basis for deriving statistical models for failure analysis. On the other hand, 
competencies such as the level of team work/cohesion is mentioned as supported to a limited 
extent.  
The summary highlights simmilarities between competencies embedded in the process 
industry and those depicted in the proposed selection framework. As such, the competencies 
cited in the studies are comparable to the prioritised selection criteria presented in this article. 
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Here, we assume that competencies supported by postulates are weighted highly compared to 
competencies with limited support. The reader will recall that competencies perceived by 
experts as critical for applying the quantitative FMEA (Q-FMEA) include reliability 
databases, personnel skills, statistical models and CMMS. Moreover, with the exception of 
functional analysis statements (FAS), the aforementioned competencies also apply for FTA.  
Thus, comparing the prioritised competencies derived from the ANP process to 
competencies supported by empirical evidence, the Q-FMEA and FTA may be recommended 
for use in the process industries. However, this depends on several aspects. Firstly, failure 
data management is mentioned as an important limitation. This is attributed to low levels of 
intergration between asset failure related databases. Often in practise, failure related 
information are stored in separate databases and seldom linked. For instance, information 
related to equipment failure mode is stored separately to consequence related information, e.g. 
spare parts usage or production loss. As such, deriving maintenance cost models can be 
problematic. With regards to applying FTA, caution is urged given challenges related to 
analysing complex systems. In essence, analysing systems with multiple depedencies between 
components or failure events is not straightforward and is computationally difficult. The Q-
FMEA simplifies quantitative analysis by assuming each failure mode as independent.  
Although mentioned as a popular technique, applying the classical FMEA in the process 
industry is limited by several prioritised competencies. These include low multi-disciplinary 
cohesion between the maintenance and operation function, the need for facilitation and ad-hoc 
RCM process. These competencies are not supported by empirical evidence as intrinsic in the 
process industries. As such, the classic FMEA is not recommended for use by firms in the 
process industries.  
 
6.2 Application for an automated guided vehicle (AGV) assembler  
 
The second illustrative case concerns a European automated guided vehicle (AGV) 
assembler. The firm difers from the process industries in several aspects, e.g. nature of 
business operations, staffing pattern and the importance attached to maintenance (Veldman et 
al., 2011). In comparison to firms in the process industry, the assember has a modest though, 
highly skilled workforce. The firm assembles the vehicles using modular components sourced 
from contracted manufacturers. Once sold, vehicle maintenance beyond the warranty period is 
the clients responsibility. However, clients have the option of sub-contracting maintenance 
services to the AGV assembler. On the other hand, AGV failure within the warranty period is 
largely the assembler’s responsibility, thus neccesitating risk mitigation.  
Deducing the firms’ competencies, the assembler maintains databases for AGV failure and 
spare part inventory. Often, the databases are vaguely structured and limited to vehicle failure 
occurrences within the warranty period. Moreover, precise records of vehicle failure modes 
are lacking. The firm lacks CMMS, but rather implements a condition monitoring system for 
tracking the client AGV’s. Here, trend analysis is the predominant diagnostic approach. The 
use of statistical models for failure analysis and quantifying asset failure cost is unclear. This 
includes the use of reliability models, e.g. time to failure (TTF) or time to repair (TTR). In 
addition, assembly manuals are maintained, often for use in the AGV assembly process. In 
terms of team work, the AGV assembly and maintenance divisions operate autonomously. 
Time pressure is also mentioned as an important limitation in relation to performing team 
tasks.  
Based on the firm’s competency, deploying a specific risk assessment technique is not 
straightforward. For instance, the classical FMEA is limited with regards to competencies, 
e.g. low team cohesion, facilitation and time pressure constraints. This is largely due to the
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divisional autonomy in the firm. Although assembly manuals are used, the manuals are 
limited to the assembly process and seldom specify critical equipment failure information, e.g. 
failure mode type. Nonetheless, availability of quantitative equipment information points to 
feasible application of quantitative risk assessment technique, e.g. the Q-FMEA. However, 
given that the information only specifies the equipment condition, several enhancements to 
the data structure is necessary. These include possible inclusion of information related to the 
type of failure mode, time to failure, time to repair, spare part usage, or production loss 
attributed to equipment failure. Inclusion of this information would assist in the derivation of 
reliability and maintenance cost models. Other competencies, e.g. highly skilled personnel 
appear embedded in the firm. This is evidenced by the presence of reliability engineers. From 
the prioritized competencies, personnel skills are weighted as important requisite for applying 
quantitative risk assessment techniques. Other important areas of improvement include 
integrating failure related databases, a limitation also noted for firms in the process industry. 
Integrated databases will ensure that the failure modes are linked to the respective failure 
consequences i.e. cost of failure.  
To conclude, the two application cases illustrate the possible steps that firms can follow to 
select appropriate technique based on the firms’ intrinsic competencies. The cases illustrate 
the versatility of the proposed selection framework with respect providing decision support to 
firms with varying business or operation context. Moreover, the comparison process discussed 
in the cases assumes the instance where the ANP process is externalized, i.e. performed by 
experts not specifically linked to the two firms. However, the ANP prioritization is also 
applicable in-house provided there is sufficient tacit knowledge regarding use of the specific 
risk assessment technique. Preferably, the selection criteria discussed in Section 5.1 may 
guide the ANP process.   
7. A general guideline for selecting appropriate risk assessment technique 
From the illustrative cases discussed, a general guideline for selecting appropriate techniques 
may be deduced. The guideline is included in Appendix A and consists of 5 key steps: 
1. In Step 1, the firm identifies organizational competencies necessary for performing 
risk assessment. The competencies are linked to steps enumerated in the ISO 31000 
standard and the guideline suggested in Section 4 is quite useful for the derivation 
process.  
2.  In Step 2, firms compare the firms intrinsic versus competencies prioritized by 
external experts. Part of reason for the external comparison may include lack of 
essential expertise for the ANP prioritization process. Examples may include limited 
knowledge regarding use of specific risk assessment techniques. The application cases 
illustrate how firms can perform Step 2.    
3. In Step 3, competencies identified in Step 1 are prioritized in-house. Here, the steps 
necessary for establishing the team of experts, ANP problem formulation and 
prioritization process are followed. Details for Step 3 are enumerated in Section 5.  
4. Step 4 depicts the comparison process between the firms’ intrinsic versus 
competencies prioritized through ANP process. The appropriate technique is one 
where the firms’ intrinsic competencies weigh highly compared to the prioritized 
competencies for the specific technique, e.g. as expounded in the illustrative use cases. 
The competencies depicted in Step 4 (Appendix A) are summarized for brevity. Thus 
depending on the competency level, a firm may select a specific technique for risk 
assessment. This is depicted by the multiple arrows originating from the decision 
module ‘competency level’. 
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5. Step 5 depicts the enhancement of specific competencies in instances where the firm 
lacks sufficient competencies or opts to apply a better and perhaps more complex 
technique. The improvement process is illustrated by the feedback loops from decision 
modules depicted in Step 4. The enhancement process is also described in the use case 
studies.  
8. Discussion and managerial implications 
In this article, a conceptual methodology for selecting risk assessment techniques in the 
asset maintenance domain is proposed. The methodology follows a deductive process for 
deriving selection criteria based on the ISO 31000:2009 standard. The selection criteria are 
generic, thus generalizable to alternative techniques applicable in asset maintenance. 
Moreover, the relative importance of each criterion varies depending on the type of technique 
applied and for this reason the ANP methodology is applied for the prioritization process. The 
ANP process incorporates the judgment and opinion of domain experts knowledgeable on 
specific techniques. As such, the proposed framework is viewed as an important decision 
support tool for maintenance practitioners not well-versed with the use of different risk 
assessment techniques. Here, the selection framework acts as an important reference point, 
allowing firms to compare intrinsic versus competencies prioritized by experts using the ANP 
process.  The selection methodology is illustrated in two case studies, the first concerning 
firms in the European process industry and the second, an automated guided vehicle (AGV) 
assembler.  
The illustrative case for the process industries indicates that based on intrinsic 
competencies supported by empirical evidence, applying quantitative techniques, e.g. the Q-
FMEA and/or FTA seems plausible. Nonetheless, several weaknesses are highlighted with 
respect to applying quantitative techniques in the process industry. These include low level of 
system integration between equipment failure related databases. For the second firm, the 
intrinsic competencies also suggest possible use of quantitative techniques, e.g. the Q-FMEA. 
However, the absence of a robust failure data management system is viewed as an important 
limitation. From the case studies, one can conclude that selecting a technique is case specific 
and largely influenced by the extent the intrinsic capabilities are embedded in the 
organization. As a result, recommendations for use are also case specific and not 
generalizable across domains.  This aspect underscores the danger of selecting techniques 
prior to considering the firm’s intrinsic competencies as often the case in practice.  
9. Conclusion 
This paper proposes a methodology for selecting appropriate risk assessment techniques in 
the context of maintenance decision making. Such techniques perform critical decision 
support role and include the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis and the 
Bayesian Network. Despite the important role the techniques perform in maintenance decision 
making, a structured methodology for selecting appropriate techniques in practice is missing 
in literature.  
In the proposed methodology, the criteria necessary for applying specific risk assessment 
techniques are derived taking into account intrinsic organizational competencies necessary for 
deploying specific techniques. Moreover, the derived criteria are linked, on the one hand, to 
the techniques, and on the other hand, the risk assessment process outlined in the ISO 
31000:2009 standard. The methodology incorporates the Analytic Network Process (ANP) 
methodology for prioritizing the selection criteria taking into account the opinion of domain 
experts knowledgeable on the specific techniques. The selection methodology forms the basis 


for comparing the firms’ intrinsic competencies relative to prioritized competencies, thus 
presenting maintenance practitioners with a plausible selection framework. 
Future work will consider extending the methodology to alternative (and more complex) 
techniques. Incorporating additional techniques provides a means for documenting tacit 
knowledge with respect to applying different risk assessment techniques. Moreover, this may 
yield a robust decision support tool for selecting suitable techniques in the maintenance 
decision making domain.  
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Table 4: Limit supermatrix for FMEA selection. 
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39 
0.0
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0.03
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Data collection schemes (SC 4) 0.035 
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Table 4: Limit supermatrix for FMEA selection (continued). 
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30 
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Failure functions (FF) 0.074 
0.0
74 0.074 
0.0
74 
0.0
74 
0.0
74 
0.0
74 
0.0
74 
0.0
74 
0.0
74 
0.0
74 
0.07
4 
Monte Carlo analysis (MC) 0.049 
0.0
49 0.049 
0.0
49 
0.0
49 
0.0
49 
0.0
49 
0.0
49 
0.0
49 
0.0
49 
0.0
49 
0.04
9 
Functional analysis statements 
(FAS) 
0.05
3 
0.0
53 0.053 
0.0
53 
0.0
53 
0.0
53 
0.0
53 
0.0
53 
0.0
53 
0.0
53 
0.0
53 
0.05
3 
Maintenance performance 
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0.01
4 
0.0
14 0.014 
0.0
14 
0.0
14 
0.0
14 
0.0
14 
0.0
14 
0.0
14 
0.0
14 
0.0
14 
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4 
Systems loss indicators (SLI) 0.020 
0.0
20 0.020 
0.0
20 
0.0
20 
0.0
20 
0.0
20 
0.0
20 
0.0
20 
0.0
20 
0.0
20 
0.02
0 
Facilitator/statistician (s) (F) 0.040 
0.0
40 0.040 
0.0
40 
0.0
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0.0
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0.0
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0.0
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0.0
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0.0
40 
0.0
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0.04
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Multi-disciplinary teams (MDT) 0.027 
0.0
27 0.027 
0.0
27 
0.0
27 
0.0
27 
0.0
27 
0.0
27 
0.0
27 
0.0
27 
0.0
27 
0.02
7 
Expert elicitation techniques 
(ELT) 
0.01
7 
0.0
17 0.017 
0.0
17 
0.0
17 
0.0
17 
0.0
17 
0.0
17 
0.0
17 
0.0
17 
0.0
17 
0.01
7 
Knowledge/skills matrix 
(K&SM) 
0.05
8 
0.0
58 0.058 
0.0
58 
0.0
58 
0.0
58 
0.0
58 
0.0
58 
0.0
58 
0.0
58 
0.0
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0.05
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Table 5: Summary of selection competencies for the process industries 
Cited 
study 
Competencies mentioned 
Level of support for 
postulate 
Braaksma 
et al. 
(2013) 
(i) Availability of plant and maintenance registers for mapping 
critical assets.  
(ii) In-house expert knowledge on equipment function and 
functional failures. 
(iii) Failure mode identification registers and/or reports. 
(iv) Use of custom spreadsheet for FMEA. 
(v) Use of structured RCM methodology and multi-disciplinary 
teams. 
(vi) Use of maintenance management system, e.g. SAP-ERP, 
CMMS. 
(vii) Availability of reliability and equipment performance 
databases. 
(i) Supported 
(ii) Supported 
(iii) Supported 
(iv) Supported 
(v) Not supported 
(vi) Supported 
(vii) Supported  
Muchiri et 
al. (2010) 
(i) Use of quantitative performance measures (e.g. reliability, 
availability, time to failure (TTF). 
(ii) Highly skilled maintenance personnel. 
(iii) Use of maintenance management systems. 
(iv) Availability of reliability and equipment performance 
databases. 
(v) Use of predictive maintenance strategies. 
(i) Supported 
(ii) Supported 
(iii) Supported 
(iv) Supported 
(v) Limited support  
Pinjala et 
al. (2006) 
(i) Use of predictive maintenance strategies. 
(ii) Highly skilled maintenance personnel. 
(iii) High level of teamwork between operation and maintenance 
staff. 
(iv) Use of maintenance management systems. 
(v) Use of quantitative performance measures. 
(i) Limited support 
(ii) Supported 
(iii) Limited support 
(iv) Supported 
(v) Supported 
(vi) Supported 
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(vi) Availability of reliability databases and equipment 
maintenance records. 
Veldman 
et al. 
(2011) 
(i) Use of analytical and statistical models for quantifying failure. 
(ii) Use of maintenance management systems. 
(iii) Highly skilled maintenance personnel. 
(iv) Follow procedures for executing maintenance programs. 
(v) Sufficient domain knowledge for managing maintenance 
programs. 
(i) Limited support 
(ii) Supported 
(iii) Supported 
(iv) Not supported 
(v) Limited support 
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